By

Hassan Kakar

This paper was read in the International Symposium: A

Prospective Review of the History and Archaeology of

Afghanistan: From Glory to Plunder, held at the Pacific

Museum in Pasadena, California on October 15, 16, 1999.

The Afghan successful repulse of the Soviet aggression became a Pyrrhic victory of the late twentieth century. It was, however not in the sense that history repeats itself, as some hold. Of course the essential motor force of history is always man, but every time he makes history he makes it under strikingly different circumstances Even the man of the third century BC when Pyrrhus, king of Epirus in Greece, invaded Italy at so great a cost, was not like the man of to-day in his outlook except for his basic drives, to say nothing of the tools with which he makes history. The Afghan victory, like the Pyrrhus’s victory, brought about also dire consequences, such consequences that shook the foundation of the territorial wholeness of their country for which the Afghans fought. Of all the consequences the one with international significance proved the most troublesome. It still is.

When the Afghans began to fight back the army of the “Soviet evil empire” nearly the whole non-Soviet world lauded them with the lofty words their men of mass media and political, public, and spiritual leaders could find. Even the top person of the first super power who at the same time was the top leader of the Western world praised the Afghans as ‘freedom fighters.” Most media men in the Western world like those in the Islamic world praised the Afghans for their gallantry, and called the attention of their readers to the fact that there in the heart of Asia was a people who stood steadfast in defence of their fatherland against the so-called invincible army of the Soviet Union. Journalists, human rights activists, academics and even some public figures endangered their lives by making secret trips to the forbidden war zones inside Afghanistan to see whether they deserved the praises with which they were lauded. Sceptics were few, and lauders numerous. The recommendations of these people in part convinced the decision making bodies of their respective countries that if ever there was a nation around the “evil empire” who deserved assistance in curbing its expansionistic designs it was these “freedom fighters”.

The words were matched with deeds. A variety of lethal weapons along with logistical materials, medicine, and funds were generously made available to the freedom fighters, the weapons for which they, known for their marksmanship, were eagerly waiting. Even the newly tested ground to air missiles, known as Stinger, were handed over to them. They were the first to receive such a weapon with which they deprived the aggressors of the safe monopoly of the commensurate of a national leader. At times efforts were made toward the formation of a pluralistic form of government but such efforts have all but failed. They have failed rincipally because of the war situation, the monopolistic designs of the committed and radical Afghans and the schemes of the ill-intentioned neighbors as already described. After the Soviet withdrawal the Secretary-General of the United Nations showed interest in assisting the Afghans to set up a broad-based government, but all his efforts through his special envoys have failed. The formula is still on the table, and is pursued by his present special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. But the formula specially in the present situation suffers from limitations and so it is unlikely that will come to fruition for the following reasons:

1 – The formula of the broad-based government is not relevant in the present situation. Originally it was put forward by the United Nations Secretary-General’s special representative, Diego Cordovez, after the Geneva Accords were signed in April 1988. At the time it was expected that following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops all the sides involved in Afghan politics would agree to, and work for, the formation of a broad-based government until the time for general election has arrived. It was hoped that the political vacuum that would result from the withdrawal would thus be filled , and anarchy avoided. This did not happen, and the formula in effect died. Nevertheless Cordovez’s successors pursued it; they also failed. The Secretary – General did not address the issue of why his envoys failed in their missions. Now he seems to want to take some drastic measures about it. But now there is no longer a political void in Afghanistan. There is now an Islamic Emirate which controls about ninety percent of the country, and has maintained order and security in its domain. It has thus gotten the right to represent Afghanistan in international communities. Only in cooperation with it can the United Nations try to resolve whatever issues it wants to pursue with regard to the country. For practical reasons also it needs to recognize and deal with it. Recognition of the Islamic Emirate would also mean changes toward its moderation.

• The broad-based government formula has now became a means for others to pressure the Afghans to set up a political system the way they think is fit. By so doing they tell the Afghans how to institute a political system for themselves. This, in fact, is an imposition and manipulation by others of the affairs which are the sole responsibility and duty of Afghans. These foreigners likewise want to limit the choice of Afghans in the matter of self-determination. All this means the negation of the basic right of Afghans, a right which is the foundation stone of their polity, just as it is the foundation stone of all polities. The Afghans gave huge sacrifices in fighting the Soviet intruders principally to assert their right to self-determination.
• The broad-based formula has now become suspect especially when some members of the six plus two, that is, Afghanistan’s six neighbors plus Russia and the United states have made it a condition for the solution of the Afghan problem. The six plus two formula gives to each of Afghanistan’s neighbors a role to play in the solution of a problem that is the exclusive rights of its own people. But almost all of its members have agendas of their own about Afghanistan. It is as if the United Nations has become an accomplice in turning Afghanistan to a protectorate of its ill-intentioned neighbors. Ever since the Soviet demise it has ceased stressing the question of sovereignty of the people of Afghanistan. It as well as the United States Administration now stress the role of Iran and Pakistan in such fundamenmtal affairs of Afghanistan which are the sole responsibility of its own people. Both condone their roles in making Afghanistan their protectorate. Ever since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan they are competing with each other in making Afghanistan their protectorate. Each has partly succeeded in making the landlocked country increasingly dependent on it by destroying Afghanistan’s infrastructures through their Afghan surrogates. The prolongation of the Afghan conflict is part of their schemes. Iran is particularly keen on its agenda. Russia for reasons of its own has become an accomplice of Iran. That is why the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has time and again accused Russia, Iran of interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan, while the rebel groups have accused Pakistan. Hence the inability of Afghanistan’s neighbors to jointly work for the solution of the Afghan problem. Even Kofi Annan has become suspicious of the group when he recently complained that ” The unabated external involvement in the Afghan conflict leads me to raise the question of the ‘six plus two’ group.” That was why the group was unable to adopt, as it was commissioned to adopt “… a joint strategy towards reaching a peaceful solution of the Afghan conflict. ” Now that Kofi Annan has become convinced that the “external involvement” in Afghan affairs has become a stumbling block, it is required of him as Secretary -General of the world body to work toward the neutralization of this “external involvement.” If he did so he would have basically resolved the Afghan problem.

4-The broad-based government formula as it is understood is intended to bring about a political set up that will be based on the quota or proportion system, in line with ethnicity and religious distinction. In such a system ethnicity and religion will be determining influences in politics. Together with other issues especially the demographic issue the system is bound to intensify divisive influences. Ethnicity-related and religion-related tensions is then likely to be endemic. Besides, the quota system will be overstressing collectivism at the expense of individual worth. Then a tension-ridden as well as a stagnant society will be the result. Among other things this is likely to become a hurdle to the rise of a civil society where democracy based on individual choice could flourish. Like any other nation the Afghan nation also needs a civil society in which individuals regardless of religious, ethnic, and gender distinction are by law able to determine a political set up of their choice, not the principle of quota or proportion by which to institute a political system.

5-Lastly, the broad-based government in the form that is demanded is impracticable. It is one thing to demand that the broad-based government should include representatives of all segments composing the Afghan society. It is quite another to demand that it be composed of the heads of the Tanzimat and ethnic militias as the group of six plus two and others seem to demand. But the heads of the Tanzimat and the militias have fought among themselves so much that they can not govern jointly. Many have disqualified themselves to govern, because they have caused destruction on a grand scale, and the killing of innocent people by the thousands. They have also made themselves the surrogates of the ill-intentioned neighbors. Most important, with the exception of Commander Ahmad Shah Mas’ud, who has been confined to a corner others have been driven out of the country. Now those who insist that such persons be included in a broad-based government are asking for the impossible. They probably want to see the war prolonged, not resolved.

The demand for a broad-based government should be in the sense that it be representative in accord with the social conventions of Afghans and the principles of human rights. In this connection in the present specific conditions of Afghanistan two suggestions are most talked about. One suggestion is the emergency loya jirga which the former King

Mohammad Zahir has put forward in November 1990. According to it an emergency loya jirga is to be convened after some preparations have been made for it by all those groups and persons who carry influence and weight in society and enjoy the confidence of their constituencies to such a degree that they can represent them. The jirga is to set up an interim government, and the latter is to prepare in suitable time the ground for the institution of an elected government on the basis of a new constitution.

The emergency loya jirga was proposed at a time when Afghanistan had no government, or had a Parcham-based government, but which, by all accounts, was considered unviable. Now it is not so. No loya jirga can be convened inside Afghanistan without the concurrence of the Islamic Emirate, while for a loya jirga to really be a loya jirga it must be convened inside the country. The Emirate stands for a loya jirga or a grand council only after the whole of Afghanistan has been reunified. Because of the existence of danger to the integrity of the country leaders of the Emirate have made the reunification their top priority. It is yet to happen. The proponents of the emergency loya jirga may try to convene it outside Afghanistan, but even if they succeed in it, which is doubtful, it will not be a loya jirga. At no time in Afghan history has a new government been instituted through a loya jirga. At all times loya jirgas have been convened inside Afghanistan by already established political authorities to meet national emergencies in consultation with influential elders of society. Also, the head of state as the embodiment of general will is the person who by tradition can summon a loya jirga. The figure upon whom the proposed emergency loya jirga hinges is the former king. But since 1973 he has lived as an Afghan citizen in Rome, and thus out of direct touch with concrete Afghan realities for over quarter of a century. He is 86 years of age and unable to speak the language of the majority. He exists only in the memory of the fading old generation, and the dynamic young generation does not relate itself to him. Now to expect him to dynamically engage in politics as he has to do so is asking too much of him. It is indeed unfair to pressure him to do so. Still some persons work under his umbrella, hoping to replace the Islamic Emirate. Since they themselves are unable to do so they rally around him in the hope that he can become an alternative. Hence the support of the emergency loya jirga even by such persons as well as groups who are essentially against it. Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad of the Rand Corporation is the most active among such persons who is shuttling between Rome and Washington. They all look upon His former Majesty as a golden means to terminate the Islamic Emirate and to promote themselves who also enjoyed a comfortable life abroad during the resistance period, but now seek power through international diplomacy. Besides, their scheme is unworkable. Still His former Majesty has let them work for it. By so doing he has made himself a golden means. Now he himself has become a problem in sharp contrast to the late King Aman Allah who under similar circumstances and in the same city remained an Afghan patriot to the last minute of his life. But for the reasons I have cited it is unrealistic to expect a government to be instituted through the emergency loya jirga no matter how hard their proponents work for it unless they cooperate with the Islamic emirate, or their foreign patrons push them to the seat of power militarily. Apparently this is what they hope for. As far back as 1994 the former king was said to have been “… seeking guarantees of their [ the Western powers led by the United States and Russia ] support to be channeled through the United Nations not only to ensure his personal safety but also to sustain his government in power in face of threats by some of the radical Islamist elements.” (11) If the former king succeed in such a scheme Afghanistan will then become a protectorate. Since this scenario is likely to involve these supporters or some of them militarily also it is unlikely they will go that far. Remember the way the West treated Mohammad Reza Pahlawi, the shah of Iran during his days of exile.

A somewhat different outcome may develop. The propaganda and activity of all of them are likely to create unrealistic hopes among some Afghans, polarize all Afghans still further, and disturb the stability which the Taliban have brought at a huge price. In such a case the centrifugal forces may find a new lease on life and the pre-Taliban anarchy is likely to reign once again while the proponents of the emergency loyajirga would have become helpless, hopeless and perhaps also indifferent spectators. They would have done a disservice to Afghanistan and Afghans.

The other most talked about suggestion concerns the leaders of the Islamic Emirate. They are required to introduce some kind of reform even though here much depends on the situation inside the country which is still one of war and destruction, as well as the attitude of the international community toward Afghanistan which is combative. So at this stage of war and hostility the Islamic Emirate is not expected to introduce comprehensive reforms, but it is required to take some initial feasible steps toward such a reform.

First the Emirate should open its fold in the non-military and non-security fields to other Afghans. For this purpose it should set up a supreme consultative council composed of competent, qualified, principled, influential and non-committed Afghans to suggest ways and means for improving the over all situation, in particular the financial and employment situation. Among other things this council should devise ways and means to enlist the cooperation of Afghan specialists in Europe, America and elsewhere in reconstruction of the country. The Emirate should also set up local consultative councils or jirgas to assist local officials in administering the country. The Emirate had initially put this system into operation. Meanwhile, the Emirate should assure the Afghans that once the country was reunified it would convene, as it had promised to convene a nation-wide grand council or loya jirga to set up a representative government for the transitional period.

Second, the Islamic Emirate should lift the restrictions it has imposed on women, shaving beards, music and the like, and observe the internationally-accepted rights of men and women, a subject that I have described elsewhere in detail. (12) For the Islamic Emirate to do so it needs to abolish the office of the Promotion of Virtues and Prevention of Prohibitions. If that is not feasible or advisable now it should discipline its men not to punish violators of the laws themselves, but only to present them to the courts.

With these measures the Islamic Emirate would have taken steps toward easing the difficult financial and unemployment situation. It would likewise have taken steps towards easing the pressure under which it finds itself. It would also have saved itself from blame for monopolizing power as its predecessors had been blamed for. It itself would have become a broad-based government of a kind even in the present war situation. About the human rights situation it would still not satisfy its intonational critics whatever it does in this respect. The international community would probably go on stressing the issue particularly the women issue the way it itself conceives it not as the Afghans conceive it. Also, the international community would continue to stress the issue without taking into account the concern of Afghans about the integrity of their fatherland and about their national sovereignty as well as about their concept of honor (namos) which, contrary to what others think, places special emphasis on the honor of their women folk. Feeling right in its stand the international community refuses to appreciate the concern of Afghans. It is not the first to do so. The British in the nineteenth century and the Soviets in the present century did the same and they both failed. Now the international community, especially the U.S. Administration, intend to repeat a similar mistake by imposing sanctions on Afghanistan, and isolating it essentially on the issue of the latter’s own creation, that is, the issue of Osama bin Laden, which is dealt with here in two other papers, A Nation Under Siege and the Afghanistan’s White Paper or Dark Paper?.

All this means that the Afghans are among the least understood people in the world. This is due essentially to the failure of Afghans themselves to introduce their ways of life as they really were in history or how they are now. Non-Afghans know them secondhand. The whole situation has been the source of misunderstandings and of problems in the past just as it is now.

Undoubtedly, the proposed sanctions in addition to the one already imposed coupled with the isolation of Afghanistan and the shunning of the Islamic Emirate by the world community are bound to hurt a people who stood steadfast in defence of decent human values against foreign aggression for which the non-Soviet international community assisted them, but now wants to punish them in collaboration strangely with the successor of the same aggressors. But as Abd al-Hakeem Mujahid has put it the sanctions probably”… would be only in the interests of Iran and Russia, which want permanent instability in Afghanistan, while the U.S. can get nothing out of it.”

In short such an action does not stand to reason, common sense and especially to justice if the word still has a meaning. Perhaps it does not at least in the minds of power players. At any rate to impose sanctions on the poor but brave people of Afghanistan who have already suffered immensely because of the Soviet aggression and the subsequent civil war for over twenty years is a tyranny (zulm) and injustice on a grand scale indeed.

Notes

• -M. H. Kakar, A Political History and the External Relations of Afghanistan . The Reign of Ameer Abd al-Rahman Khan, unpublished manuscript. Chapter 2
• -M. H. Kakar, Afghanistan, a Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880-1896, Punjab

Education Press, Lahore, Kabul, 1971, 35

3.- Kakar, unpublished manuscript, Chapter 10

4-Haroun, Da’ud Khan da KGB pa lomo ki (Da’ud Khan in the Trap of the KGB), Khybar Publication, [Germany ], [1994].

5- Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, An Insider’s Account, Brgamon-Brassey’s

International Defense Publishers, 1988, Washington, New York, 179

6-Bruce G. Richardson, Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of Soviet Terror, Maverick

Publications, Bend, Oregon, Second Edition, 1998, 52

7-Faqir Mohammad Wadan, Dashna haye surkh dar Afghanistan, siyasathaye moscow wa asarat -e-aan bar inkishaf-e-awza’ dar Afghanistan (The Red Daggers, Moscow’s Policies and their Effects on the Developments of Situations in Afghanistan) privately published, Germany, 1999, 85-93

8-Kakar, Afghanistan, The Policy of Intrigue, Myopia, and Hatred, Jirga, publication of the

Afghan Movement for A Representative Government in Afghanistan, Los Angeles, Vol. 1 , Number 5, April 1993,10-19

9-Kakar, Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982, University of California Press, 1995, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 276

10- Mohammad Ibrahim Kakar, personal communication, California, September, 1999 11-Rahimullah Yusufzai, in Kakar (1995), 298

12-Kakar, ed. Essays on the Population, History and Current Affairs of Afghanistan, Sapi 15

Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar, (in Pashto and Dari) , 1999.

Afghan sky. The weapons along with diplomatic support of the peoples and governments of the non-Soviet world further strengthened the resolve of the freedom fighters in defending their values against the intruders. The intruders were forced to retreat, a retreat which in effect was their defeat and their failure to dominate the land of the freedom fighters militarily. No people of other country around the evil empire which it had invaded had scored such a victory. They even played a part in shaking its foundation. Shortly afterward it disintegrated and out of its ashes emerged more than a dozen independent states. The bipolarised world became history, the Cold War was gone, the Berlin Wall crumbled, and the United States emerged as the sole super power of the time with the mightiest economy in decades.

All the above happened after the Western world and the Islamic world helped the Afghan freedom fighters to hit more effectively the Soviet aggressors. This was in the atmosphere of the Cold War in which the Western world had been engaged in devising military and other kinds of schemes that required huge expenditure.

In spite of all this governments of the Western world furned their backs on the Afghans as soon as the “evil empire” disappeared. This it did at a time when Afghanistan had been devastated by the war. In this grand destruction the weapons of the Western world had also played a part. It was thought that if there ever was a country that was entitled to assistance in its reconstruction efforts it was the land of the freedom fighters. They had expected that the Western world and the United States in particular owed them a moral responsibility in helping them reconstruct their ruined country, or at least to try to restrain others from interfering in its internal affairs. Instead they left them to the mercy of their ill-intentioned neighbors. These neighbors who should have been grateful to the Afghans for securing them from the ever present menace of the evil empire acted as if they were the new Soviets. History played its most cruel trick on the Afghans.

The “new Soviets” or the ill-intentioned neighbors thought that the Afghans who had been intoxicated by their victory over the army of the Soviet super power and experienced in the use of sophisticated weapons might pose a danger to them. They had become concerned about the varieties of sophisticated weapons which the Afghans had accumulated in abundance. Since nearly all had in the past grudges against the Afghans for various reasons they thought that the time had now come to dominate Afghanistan. Whatever the specific designs of each one of them they were united in pursuing one particular goal which was that Afghanistan should not have a strong national government with a strong army. Some even treaded on the road that was intended to lead to more than one Afghanistan. In pursuing such a policy they were in fact going on the footsteps of the former Soviet Union. They then designed means and ways intended to embroil the Islamic Tanzimat (Islamic Organizations) both themselves and their country. These were the issues with various offshoots which the Afghans face to the present day. Let me deal here with two basic issues.

The scheme of more than one Afghanistan

The notion of more than one Afghanistan or its fragmentation into parts had its origin in the second British war with Afghanistan when first the British Government of India and subsequently the Imperial government of Russia had entertained it. Lord Lytton, the British viceroy of India, had actually turned the notion into a policy when the British troops had occupied Afghanistan. But the Afghans frustrated him in his design. (1) At the same time, the secretary to General von Kauffman, the Russian governor-general in Tashkand, persuaded the then fugitive Sardar Abd al-Rahman Khan in Tashkand to set up a new state in northern

Afghanistan with Russian assistance. He was, however, not the kind of person to go along with Russia’s design after he became ameer. (2)

Both super powers of the time acted with a view to making the Hindu Kush the boundary of their empires, which meant the partition of Afghanistan. Not long afterward the British government of India imposed the Durand Agreement on Ameer Abd al-Rahman Khan that eventually partitioned Afghanistan by separating original Afghanistan from present day Afghanistan. (3). This imperialistic act along with other developments ultimately led to the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The British, however, until their departure from India assisted Afghan rulers in consolidating their kingdom or what remained of it. This was, however, not so with the Russians, who especially in the Soviet era even pressured Afghan governments to suppress any one or any group of people north of the Hindu Kush who, they thought, were anti-Russians. (4) Not to antagonize the Soviets the Afghan governments did what they they asked them, until on the same issue an encounter took place between Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, and President Mohammad Da’ud in the Kremlin on 12 April 1977.

In the words of an observer, “Brezhnev complained that the number of experts from NATO countries working in Afghanistan in bilateral ventures, as well as in the UN and other multilateral aid projects, had considerably increased. In the past, he said, the Afghan government at least did not allow experts from NATO countries to be stationed in northern parts of the country, but this practice was no longer strictly followed. The Soviet Union, he continued, took a grim view of these developments and wanted the Afghan government to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent on promoting the cause of imperialism.” In response President Da’ud became as surprising to the Russians as they had become to the Afghans. After his initial diplomatic words, President Da’ud addressed Leonid Brezhnev in these words:. “… we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions.” (5)

The Brezhnev-led Soviets proved that they were dead serious in what they had said to President Da’ud. They invaded Afghanistan in 1979. But the tough resistance the Afghans offered convinced them that the late President Daud was right in his words to Brezhnev. The Afghans did not let the Soviets to pacify Afghanistan. The Soviets had hoped they would pacify Afghanistan in a matter of months as they had pacified Bukhara early in the century and some East European countries following World War Two. They then took such measures with respect to northern Afghanistan that were intended to eventually separate it from the rest of the country. Obviously, they intended to secure a natural boundary for their empire as Lord Lytton had tried to secure the same boundary for the British empire a century earlier.

For this purpose, as instructed by the Soviets, their client regime in Kabul took measures along that line. Included among the measures were the quartering in Mazar of a subgovernment composed of deputy ministers headed by a deputy premier, the authorization of provincial governors north of the Hindu Kush to exchange missions directly with the Soviet Central Asian republics, the extension of electric power from across the Oxus River to some of these provinces, the construction over the Oxus River of a new bridge, the “Friendship Bridge” (pul-e-dosti), the almost free travel of officials from both sides to northern Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and no comparable severe military operations in northern Afghanistan on the part of the Soviet army. This policy had a beginning in 1982 when the client regime embarked on the policy of nationalities according to which the Afghan nationalities, that is, ethnic groups, were declared brothers and equal to each other. In fact by this policy the regime started encouraging the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in nortern Afghanistan to unite against the Pashtuns who, by virtue of being in the majority and the producer of the ruling dynasties ever since 1747, were the most militant against the invaders and the client regime. The client regime also permitted certain minority ethnic groups to organize militias, and generously provided them weapons and funds. The regime used some such militias as storm troopers. The most known of these were the Uzbek militias of the province of Jouzjan in northern Afghanistan headed by Abd al Rasheed Dostum, who, by 1992, was said to have 60, 000 armed men under his command. (6)

Had the Soviet Union not been dissolved on December 25, 1991 the Afghans would have found it more difficult to reunite their land. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, did not mean that the policy of fragmentation was given up. Federal Russia and following her the government of Iran as well as the new republic of Uzbekistan followed it. For this purpose they supported with weapons and money Dostum as well as the Islamic Unity Party headed by Mazari, a pro-Khumeini party. Through its agents the Russian consulate in Mazar became particularly active. They worked for the success of Dostum and against the government in Kabul led by President Najib Allah, even though the latter had been the most loyal man of the Kremlin throughout the occupation period.( 7 )

On March 21, 1992 heads of five minority groups claiming to represent the ethnic groups to which they belonged in collusion with some military and civilian personnel of the pro-Karmal faction of the former People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan set up what was called the Northern Coalition in Mazar. Azad Khan Uzbek of Uzbekistan and leader of the

Union of the North and Mr. Najafi, an official of the intelligence service of Iran, also attended the meeting. The purpose was to topple the government of President Najib Allah and terminate the traditional Pashtun rule in Afghanistan. This was the first time that some men from minority ethnic groups made an anti-Pashtun coalition at the instigation of agents of foreign governments. The blind forces of hatred were collectively given a vent. In Mazar Dostum, now calling himself the head of the Islamic and National Movement made himself pasha ( ruler) by a successful coup. He had now under him a strong militia with light and heavy weapons of all kinds, including some air power and the Scud missiles. All the provinces from Badakhshan to Herat in northern Afghanistan that were severed from Kabul fell into the hands of Dostum, Commander Ahmad Shah Mas’ud., and Commander Mohammad Isma’il Khan ( 8) Afghanistan was in fact but not in name fragmented.

On April 14, the coalition led by followers of Babrak Karmal, by Commander Ahmad Shah Masud and Dostum made a successful coup against President Najib Allah, who took asylum in the headquarters of the United Nations in Kabul. No one, however, dared to set up a government. The setting up of a new government was considered to be the prerogative of the Islamic Tanzimat who had waged a relentless opposition throughout the occupation period against the Soviet invaders. In Peshawar on April 24, 1992 in the presence of nearly all the heads of the Tanzimat and the premier of Pakistan, the heads of the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and two ambassadors of Iran a formula was designed which made the heads of two non-Pashtun Tanzimat to lead the new interim government in Kabul.(9)

The Peshawar Accord had a common ground with the Northern Coalition. In both persons from minority ethnic groups were raised to high power. In both the Pashtun majority was excluded from holding high power. In both agents of the ill-intentioned neighbors including Russia worked for the promotion of their Afghan surrogates. From both nationalistic and other groups were excluded. In both the concept of ethnic collectivism was stressed at the expense of individual qualification. Finally and most important, both were designed to do away with the existing standing army which could have been manipulated and used as a bulwark against instability which usually crops up during the uncertain period of transition. The outcome became an unimaginable disaster that the Afghans experienced during the period of the Tanzimat.

During this period when the existing standing army had disintegrated all the radical Tanzimat fought against each other. So did the ethnic militias. They all turned against the helpless civilians. This became a period of unprecedented anarchy, kidnapping, looting, raping, robbing, imprisoning, torturing, killing and the imposition of exorbitant taxes on merchandises in hundreds of posts along the roads. All these were perpetrated by armed men belonging to the ethnic militias, the radical Tanzimat and even the so-called government in Kabul. The armed groups of freebooters and thugs of various stripes also became active. Such things became the order of the day not only in the city of Kabul where a government led by President Burhan al-Deen existed in name but also throughout the country that was fragmented and mastered by self-appointed autonomous governors and commanders. All this happened in the period of runaway inflation where in Kabul fathers would present their children to markets for others to take and feed and keep. The city of Kabul which had become as a result of years of modernization schemes the center of a flourishing and cosmopolitan civilization was almost all destroyed. It still is in ruin. Approximately 60,000 of its residents were killed in the fighting. Over one and a half millions of its residents were forced to flee to the countryside or Pakistan. Any person throughout the land who could not protect himself, his family or property was exposed to danger. Afghanistan had become an inferno more in this period than even in the occupation period until the Taliban ended the reign of terror.

It was impossible for the Taliban to accomplish what they accomplished without the prevalence of the situation as described. It was unthinkable for the Taliban to score spectacular victories without the active support of the local population and the discords in the ranks of the radical Tanzimat and militias. It was also impossible for the Taliban to rise without having strong convictions against tyranny (zulm). In no other period of Afghan history religious functionaries have become the ruling power. Perhaps at no other period such a situation had prevailed in Afghanistan .

The event that led directly to the rise of the Taliban shows this in part. Mulla

Mohammad Omar of the village of Sangisar in the district of Panjwayee (Aerghandab?) in

Kandahar accompanied by a number of his talibs (students of Islamic learning) asked Commander Salih Mohammad to release the women he had brought down from a passenger bus coming from Herat and held with himself. Like many armed commanders who had set up tax posts @ataks) along highways for exacting exorbitant taxes Salih Mohammad too had done the same on the Kandahar-Herat highway. The mulla pleaded with him to free the women because, said he, “…seizing the women of other people was against Islam and against Pashtunwali [the Pashtun codes of behavior] and that it would provoke the Heratis to seize in revenge the women of Kandahar who might be our sisters or wives or mothers.” Salih Mohammad declined the request and further threatened him with gouging his second eye. The mullah had lost one eye during the resistance. Mullah Mohammad Omar retreated, but determined to do something about it. The mulla collected a number of his companions and followers and attacked Salih Mohammad in his post. Salih Mohammad was killed and his weapons fell into the mulla’s hands. Afterward he got rid of many other such local commanders either by persuasion or force until in November 1994 he wrested Kandahar itself from its autonomous masters: Gul Agha, Naqib Allah, Ameer Lalay, and Haji Ahmad, masters who belonged respectively to the four main divisions of the Durranay tribal confederation of the province, that is, Barakzay , Alkozay, Popalzay and Achakzay. (10)

For the Taliban the fall of Kandahar proved a turning point. It was followed by the fall of Ghazni shortly afterward, of Herat on September 5, 1995, of Jalalabad on September 13, 1996 and of Kabul on September 27, 1996. All this meant a sweep of the Taliban over the Kabul government, over the Tanzimat and the ethnic militias south of the Hindu Kush as well as the suppression of criminals, kidnappers, robbers, rapists, tax posts and the like. It also meant general disarmament and the maintenance of security, an accomplishment of immense significance. It likewise meant momentum for the forces of reunification at the expense of centrifugal forces which the interventionistic policies of the ill-intentioned neighbors were reinforcing all this time mainly through their Afghan surrogates.

The country was still far from united. All the regions north of the Hindu Kush and a few provinces close to Kabul were still held by others. Critics argued that since these regions were not populated as much by the ethnic Pashtuns as the other regions had been the Taliban, most of whom are Pashtuns would be unable to pacify them especially when the heads of the opposing groups enjoyed the active support of Iran and Russia, and that under the supervision of the Russian consul in Mazar they had made a new anti-Taliban Alliance in Khinjan on October 10, 1996. It was even argued that the sweep of the religious-minded, Pashtun-dominated, and hard-line rustic Taliban would perpetuate the division of the country. Hence the increase in weapons and cash by Iran and Russia to the groups composing the new Alliance. The Alliance was, however, negative in the sense that it was exclusively against the Taliban. That was why no unified military command was set up. Besides, its strongest member, that is, the National and Islamic Movement led by General Dostum suffered from internal cracks. The sweep of the Taliban also produced favorable responses among the people north of the Hindu Kush. Conversely, the presence of the Russian consul in Khinjan made the Alliance unpopular. All Afghans were bewildered by it and most cursed those who had made it.

In May 1997 Abd al-Malik Pahlawan, the second in command of the National and

Islamic Movement staged a coup against General Dostum, and invited the Taliban to Mazar. The joint forces of the Taliban and Abd al-Malik forced Dostum to flee the country, and occupied Mazar. But all of a sudden the table turned against the Taliban. Seemingly the Taliban brought a disaster of momentous magnitude upon themselves. Instead of trying to consolidate their position in an uncertain situation some commanders ordered the Taliban to forcefully implement unpopular measures in the name of Islamic Shari’at in complete disregard to the wishes of the people. Their new ally along with their old foes joined hands against the Taliban and routed them completely. Over 5,000 of the Taliban were imprisoned along with a number of their commanders. Probably over 3,000 of these imprisoned Taliban were subsequently slaughtered. The Taliban lost Mazar as quickly as they had occupied it.

Another column of the Taliban came to the north through the Salang tunnel and occupied the province of Kunduz. They, thus, got a foothold in the north. The presence of this column frightened their foes who invited Dostum to return. He once again took command and Malik Pahlawan fled to Iran. Dostum was, however, no longer the strong man that he had been even in Mazar which was divided between various groups. Mazar was declared the headquarters of the deposed regime of Rabbani whom the government of Iran still recognized. Through its consul in Mazar Iran provided military experts to all especially the pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party led by Karim Khalili. The first leader of the Party, ‘Abd al-‘Ali Mazari had been killed. The Islamic Unity Party became more active than ever because of the weapons, money and encouragement it received from Iran on an increasingly large scale. Iran’s strategy at this stage was to deliver weapons by air to any group that opposed the Taliban. Its transport planes carrying weapons landed two or three times a week at the airfields of Shiberghan, Bamian and Bagram. ‘Alaw al-Deen Brojurdi, the man Iran had put in charge of Afghan affairs made trips regularly to Bamian and northern Afghanistan. Iran was determined to build a strong block against the Taliban and worked to prevent another sweep of the Taliban to the north.

Nevertheless, the second sweep of the Taliban began from the province of Badghis north-east of Herat in July 1998. This time they were alone in their sweep, and respected the wishes of the local population, even addressing their rallies, telling them that they had come to deliver them from the clutches of the mercenaries and atheists. They first occupied the province of Faryab, with its capital of Maimana, the home town of Malik Pahlawan, and soon afterward the province of Jouzjan with its capital of Shiberghan the home town of Dostum. He vigorously resisted the Taliban, but could not turn the tide. Once again he fled.

The Taliban were in Shiberghan when their supporters in the province of Balkh with its capital at Mazar invited them to their province. The people of Hazhdah Nahr around the ancient city of Balkh even urged them to come. The Taliban even though they were unprepared for the undertaking accepted the call. Mazar came under fire by columns of the Taliban from Kunduz, and Shiberghan in conjunction with local supporters especially from the Balkh area. By this time even though Mazar had received some reinforcements all groups of the Northern Alliance had deserted the city. Only the pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party had remained in the city. But against the determined and united front of the Taliban and the local population Mazar could not be defended. The Taliban and their allies took the city by storm in a matter of hours on Saturday August 8, 1998. The losses in men for the Unity Party was immense, particularly of those fleeing the scene. The occupation of Mazar was followed by the rapid advance of the Taliban in adjacent provinces until on 13 September 1998 they also occupied Bamian, the capital of Hazarajat, the stronghold of the pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party. Thus Mazar after 6 years and the Hazarajat after 18 years of separation were reincorporated in Afghanistan and the reunification of the land was now almost complete.

The most important accomplishment of the Taliban is the following: After twenty years of the Soviet invasion and the civil war during which time the country had been in a state of fragmentation they have brought it to the brink of reunification. They accomplished this at a time when the difficulties confronting them were far more formidable than at any time since

the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The internal difficulties were even sharper at the time than at any time since Ahmad Shah Durranay founded Afghanistan. In the present civil war the internal powers have had more weapons than any other groups had in any other period of civil war. In the present period there had sprung up many rival political and military centers of power based on ethnicity and region, a situation which had not sprung up in any other period of civil war. To the extent that in the present period power seekers had gone much under the influence of foreign governments others in no other period had gone. Finally to the extent that these foreign governments had designed schemes on Afghanistan and had prolonged the state of war through their Afghan surrogates others have not done so. What the Taliban and their leaders accomplished no other groups of Afghans could. They accomplished all this at a time when the Afghans as a nation were in disarray, while the ill-intentioned neighbors devised scheme after scheme to hurt them and break-up their country. Afghanistan, in fact, had faced a most severe crisis of its integrity. Therefore the accomplishments of the Taliban and of their commanders are equal to all those which the Afghans have accomplished after Ahmad Shah Durranay had founded Afghanistan. In short with dauntless spirit and huge sacrifices they have in face of insurmountable odds secured Afghanistan for its own people.

A National Government for Afghanistan.

Afghan Make or Foreign Make?

Since the Soviet invasion Afghanistan had no national government. During the period of the Tanzimat the Afghans came closer to having one, but whatever it was it was not a

national government. The state that was called the Islamic State of Afghanistan became ineffective. It became ineffective because it was the outcome of the Peshawar Accord which had been devised essentially by foreign powers. Hence the chaos and anarchy which the Afghans face to this day. Now if the purpose is a viable political set up for Afghans it should be devised by their own chosen or selected representatives. In the present situation this seems more of an ideal than a realizable goal. For in the present war situation groups of Afghans prefer to grab the state power by force. But even now if a group or groups of people possess state power they can remain in power only if they make it representative or fairly so by sharing power with persons drawn from all levels until such a time when a loya jirga or a grand council is convened or the ground for general elections is prepared. In other words they must not only not monopolize state power, they should also satisfy the people by providing them security of life and security of property as well as respecting their legitimate rights, their legitimate wishes and attend to their legitimate needs even if there is still no new constitution and no lawful national government. Unfortunately this has not been the case so far.

Whatever form of government that has come to be set up by the Afghans or a group or groups of them since the April coup of 1978 has been monopolistic. For whatever reason no Afghan active on the national scene has come out with the vision, agenda and actions